
















In this paper I introduce the concept of biodiversity by means of its peculiar story and defend the 
importance of biodiversity as an autonomous object of scientific enquiry (Sections 1 and 2). I then 
discuss two difficulties, (i) the lack of an agreed definition and (ii) the elusiveness of the notion of 
biodiversity. While I argue that (i) is a problem that can be handled, I suggest that (ii) follows from 
the vagueness of the concept of diversity and its cognate kind (Sections 3 and 4). Yet, the notion of 
kind, connecting biodiversity to taxonomy, indicates the path to follow in order to explore what 






The variety of the forms of life has always been a subject of philosophical reflection. Already 
Plato promoted the idea that life tends to manifest itself in the greatest possible variety of 
forms––the “principle of plenitude”, as A.O. Lovejoy (1964) named it. Aristotle––who, 
unlike Plato, directly studied the natural world––in addition to producing the first biological 
taxonomies (The history of animals includes the description of nearly six hundred species) 
was probably the first to reveal a double characterization, scientific and aesthetic, of the 
diversity of life, claiming in Parts of animals that all species, from the most repugnant to the 
most beautiful ones, are of the same value insofar as each of them embodies both nature and 
beauty. Leibnizʼs “principle of variety” is but another example of this long philosophical 
tradition. 
 
Nevertheless, biodiversity as conceived today seems to mean something peculiar and to 
imply something more than mere aesthetic or largely anthropocentric considerations. Indeed, 
the term “biodiversity” was coined only in 1986 to express a politically laden and 
ecologically centered concept: biodiversity originates with its own crisis, as something to be 
preserved. The term registered immediately a huge success, and today the debate on 
biodiversity ranges widely in the life sciences as well as in our daily lives. Biodiversity has 
become rapidly central to the interests of scientists (biologists, agronomists, ecologists), 
governments (the Convention on Biological Diversity, CBD, came into force in 1993 and 
currently involves 193 countries), and the media. However, despite all the events and actions 
dedicated to this topic, defining biodiversity, understanding what it is, describing it, 
inventorying it, and establishing appropriate policies aimed at its conservation and 
improvement are extremely complex tasks, some of which call for detailed analysis. In 
particular, while a great deal of studies has been devoted to the measurement of diversity and 
the comparative evaluation of various methods of measurement, relatively little attention has 
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been paid to the concept of biodiversity itself. How is ‘biodiversity’ defined? And what is 
meant by that definition? Simple as these questions might seem, at present there is no 
agreement on how exactly one should understand the term ‘biodiversity’. Biodiversity is 
immediately and generically perceived as something to be protected, loaded with scientific, 
ethical, and political meanings. Why is this so? The emergence of the term is a case of 
dynamical social construction of environmental problems: the rapid and anthropogenic 
decline of biological diversity induced U.S. scientists to introduce the term ‘biodiversity’ and 
to launch the campaign for the conservation of biological diversity (cf. Koricheva & Siipi 
2004; Haila 2004). In particular, two main and intertwined problems have to be addressed: 
the lack of a shared definition and the vagueness of the term. Most straightforwardly, 
biodiversity is equated with the variety of life and refers collectively to variation at all levels 
of biological organization. But such a characterization, per se, means everything and nothing. 
Fortunately, the challenge of clarifying what biodiversity is can rely on a venerable 
philosophical discipline that has to do with things and their categorization, namely 




2. A brief history of the naissance of a new scientific object   
 
Biodiversity came to the fore as an important environmental issue through a process of 
deliberate social construction including the coinage of the name, the scientification of the 
concept, and the impressive spreading of initiatives devoted to the maintenance and 
preservation of the object.  
 
Phase 1: Coinage of the name ‘biodiversity’ 
While the idea or concept of the variety of life has been around since the early days of 
philosophy, the term ‘biodiversity’ and (I suggest) the corresponding scientific object are of 
rather recent coinage. The expression ‘biological diversity’ came into usage in the late 1970s. 
It was blended into ‘BioDiversity’ by biologist Walter G. Rosen during the organization of 
the “National Forum on BioDiversity” in 1986 (see Takacs 1996), and this term finally 
became ‘biodiversity’ in the title of the volume collecting the proceedings of that conference 
(Biodiversity, edited by E.O. Wilson in 1988). The reason that led evolutionary biologists and 
ecologists to introduce the name were basically political: the new name was intended as a 
slogan to draw the attention (and support) of decision makers, governments, scientists, and 
citizens to the rapid decreasing in the number of species. In particular, the intention was to 
raise political and academic awareness of species loss and decline caused by human 
activities. (Some researchers suggested that we are facing an unprecedented loss of species. 
Wilson 1992 hypothesized that the extinction rate could be between 27,000 and 100,000 
species per year, though not everybody agrees on these figures.)  
 
Phase 2: Scientification of the biodiversity concept  
As I mentioned, when it was coined, the term ‘biodiversity’ was (implicitly or explicitly) 
intended to refer to the variety of species. In his contribution to the proceedings of the 
National Forum, Wilson explicitly identified the amount of biological diversity with the 
number of species, and the loss of diversity with the extinction of species. The reason for that 
identification becomes clearer in his The Diversity of Life (1992, p. 14): 
 
Eliminate one species, and another increases in number to take its place. Eliminate a great many 
species, and the local ecosystem starts to decay visibly. Productivity drops as the channels of the 
nutrient cycles are clogged. More of the biomass is sequestered in the form of dead vegetation and 
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slowly metabolizing, oxygen starved mud, or is simply washed away … Fewer seeds fall, fewer 
seedlings sprout. Herbivore decline, and their predators die away in close concert. 
 
The literature grew fast: from the early monographic volumes by E.O. Wilson to the five-
volume Encyclopedia of Biodiversity edited by Princeton ecologist S.A. Levin (2001). 
Koricheva & Siipi (2004) calculated1 that the number of scientific papers on biodiversity 
issues has grown exponentially since the late 1980s, exceeding 3,000 per year by 2004 and 
spreading across different scientific disciplines (mainly evolutionary biology, conservation 
biology, ecology, and taxonomy, but also paleontology, microbiology, oceanography).   
  
Phase 3: Policies devoted to biodiversity  
As said, the main reason to coin the label ‘biodiversity’ was to draw attention to species loss, 
with an emphasis on the loss of species caused by human activities. Accordingly, the word 
(and the concept) rapidly became the center of a large amount of international political 
treaties, beginning with the CBD (which was signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1992) and the 
equally impressive Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (1992), an international agreement 
devoted to face the potential risks posed to biodiversity by genetically modified organisms. 
(One of the main (and most controversial) goals of CBD2 was actually “the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by 
appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, 
taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate 
funding”.)3 Besides political treatises, several initiatives have been carried out to raise the 
awareness of the governments and the general public: 2010 has been declared International 
Year of Biodiversity by the UN, and on December 2010 (also in consideration of the fact that 
the CBD target for that year, namely “to achieve a significant reduction of the current rate of 
biodiversity loss at the global, regional and national level”, had not been reached), the UN 
declared the period from 2011 to 2020 the UN-Decade on Biodiversity.  
 
Because of the political demand that is at the basis of the process of its naissance, some 
authors suggest that biodiversity is not a genuine object of inquiry for natural science and 
should be abandoned. While I agree that the massive use (and misuse) of the word 
‘biodiversity’ by the media may cause a negative reaction (cf. Ch. Lévêque, forthcoming), I 
think that this objection—and the dismissal of the biodiversity concept—misses the point. 
The so-called “construction” of scientific objects is a rather common practice in science (see 
Hacking 1999). It can be understood as a way to focus the attention—in certain historical 
periods—on certain particular features of the world. Those features have always been there, 
though; it is just that they had not been deemed significant or worthy of scientific attention.                                                         
1 The calculation was based on the occurrence of the term ‘biodiversity’ in biological abstracts. It is worth 
noting that while biodiversity has already occasioned an enormous amount of scientific literature, the 
philosophical literature is still rather scarce. As far as I now, an explicit “philosophy of biodiversity” has been 
addressed in only three books: Philosophie de la biodiversité by Virginie Maris (Buchet-Chastel, 2010); What is 
Biodiversity? by James Maclaurin and Kim Sterelny (The University of Chicago Press, 2008); Philosophy and 
Biodiversity edited by Markku Oksanen and Juhani Pietarinen (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
2 The CBD text can be downloaded at the link: http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf 
3 The issue of the intellectual property of bioengineered food, and more generally patents’ property, is probably 
among the several reasons that explain why the United States, which was among the champions of the CBD, has 
not yet ratified the Convention. The CBD was opened for signature on June 5, 1992, at the Rio “Earth Summit” 
hosted by UNEP (the United Nations Environment Program). It was ratified in 1993 by 193 countries (192 
countries plus the EU) with the exception of three outliers: the tiny principate of Andorra; the Holy See (0.44 
square kilometers of cobblestones and brick, whose biological concern is not particularly high—although the 
appropriateness of the Vatican’s contribution to the conservation of biodiversity as an humanitarian goal could 
be discussed, but this is another matter); and the 9.83 million km2 United States.  
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(A similar point is made by C.Z Elgin with is notion of ‘reconfiguration’, see for instance 
Elgin 2002.) The demands that are at the basis of the process of construction do not seem to 
affect the autonomy and scientific interest of the corresponding objects. To illustrate, 
consider briefly two examples: race and gender.   
 
Race became a scientific object in modern times, with the development of the biological 
conception of race. In antiquity, human beings were not sorted by phenotypical traits. Traits 
as skin color were of course noticed, but they were not used to sort people into discrete racial 
categories. Groupings were rather made on the bases of social or cultural characters. Among 
the Greeks and the Romans, for instance, the main division was based on the political 
affiliation of citizenship. Even the distinction between Greeks and Barbarians that can be 
found in Aristotle was based, not on biological traits but on political considerations: Greeks 
are those who organize themselves into city-states, Barbarians are those who do not. 
Similarly, in the Western middle ages, the primary division among human beings was drawn 
between believers and non-believers. And so on. The scientific concept of race, based on 
phenotypical traits, is a modern construction4, the result of a multifaceted process that 
involved naturalists, philosophers, and medical doctors. In particular, it was the result of the 
prevailing of polygenism (the idea that different human species have different roots) over 
monogenysm (holding the unity of the human species and its common root). Arguably, it was 
also the result of the establishing of a genealogical style of reasoning that was foreign to 
natural history until the middle of the eighteenth century, dominated by a Linnaean logical 
and classificatory style of reasoning (see Doron 2012). And just as it rose, however, the 
scientific object of race declined. Thanks to the work of, among others, Federico and Luca 
Cavalli-Sforza (1993), the biological base of the concept of race was eventually rejected, and 
today races are no longer considered scientific objects. 
 
Gender is a more recent example. In the late Sixties, the coextensiveness of the categories 
female/woman and male/man was called into question, mainly in order to oppose biological 
determinism—broadly, the idea that sexual differences determine cultural and behavioral 
differences, plus the idea that biological facts justify social norms. In 1968, psychologist 
Robert Stoller introduced the term ‘gender’ specifically as the social counterpart of biological 
sex, to account for the phenomenon of transexuality, i.e, to explain the experience of being 
“trapped in the wrong body”. Since then, the concept of gender has spread in both scientific 
and philosophical literature, and today it is part of ordinary discourse. (Notice that, 
notwithstanding its popularity, gender too is now being questioned). 
 
Now, biodiversity is not so different from those of race and gender, though of course there 
may be differences when it comes to their scientific and political use. In particular, while race 
was misused as a supposed biological basis for racism, the social construction of biodiversity 
has nourished with new life several scientific disciplines, put the environmental crisis on the 
top of decision makers’ agenda, and raised the awareness of common people across the 
planet. In other words, unlike race – and more like gender – the “construction” of biodiversity 
appears to have had mainly positive outcomes.  
 
That being said, at least a caveat is in order: vernacular biodiversity does not and need not 
correspond to scientific biodiversity. While scientists and the general public agree on the 
ethical aspects of the issue (both agree on attributing value to biodiversity), the main goal of                                                         
4 The first modern occurrence of the race concept is probably in Francois Bernier’s A New Division of the Earth 
(1684), where the French physician presented a division of humanity into five species or races by means of their 
“remarkable differences” (skin tones, hair texture, bone structure, etc.) 
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scientists—especially conservation biologists—is to elaborate adequate biodiversity measures 
to be used in biodiversity conservation. And while the common-sense concept of biodiversity 
is affected by aesthetic considerations (never mind bacteria; let’s save the giant panda and the 
Siberian tigers), the scientific concept is not. Moreover, from a scientific point of view it 
would be more appropriate to speak of biodiversities in the plural, because of the different 
levels at which biodiversity can be considered and because of the different ways in which 
biodiversity gets “specialized” in the different disciplines that study it. (See below, Section 
4.) In other words, while scientists aim to make the concept of biodiversity more precise—
mainly by parceling it out—common-sense biodiversity remains a fundamentally imprecise 
and vague notion. And, paradoxically, these characteristics appear to favor the popularity of 
the concept among the general public:  
 
People respond to it, it works, because each of us can find in it what we cherish… What is it you 
most prize in the natural world? Yes, biodiversity is that, too. In biodiversity each of us finds a 
mirror for our most treasured natural images, our most environmental concerns. (Takacs 1996: 81) 
 
 
3.  Defining Biodiversity 
 
Having distinguished the scientific and the vernacular meanings of biodiversity, we can focus 
on the first. There are, unfortunately, many different definitions of biodiversity available in 
the literature. Consider:  
Biological diversity means the variability among living organisms from all sources including inter 
alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they 
are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems. (CBD 1992) 
 
Biodiversity is ‘the variety of life’, and refers collectively to variation at all levels of biological 
organization. (Gaston & Spicer 1998: 3) 
 
Biodiversity is not simply the number of genes, species, ecosystems, or any other group of things 
in a defined area ... More useful than a definition, perhaps, would be a characterization of 
biodiversity that identifies the major components at several levels of organization. (Noss 1990) 
 
Biodiversity is an attribute of an area and specifically refers to the variety within and among living 
organisms, assemblages of living organisms, biotic communities, and biotic processes, whether 
naturally occurring or modified by humans. (DeLong 1996) 
 
These are just a few examples. In his review of the relevant literature from 1976 to 1996, Don 
C. DeLong (1996) lists no less than 85 definitions of biodiversity. Such definitions differ 
primarily in their degree of inclusiveness: from those that include the present/past/future of 
all life on Earth to those that restrict biodiversity to the state of a specific area at a given time; 
from those that include processes to those that only countenance entities; from those that 
include human-induced biodiversity (such as alien species, or genetically modified crops) to 
those that exclude it from the inventory, equating biodiversity with wilderness; and so on. 
The table below summarizes a representative selection of DeLong’s 85 definitions, in order 






What are we to make of the fact that there are so many definitions of biodiversity, often 
inconsistent with one another? As a matter of fact, using a term with different meanings can 
be one of the major stumbling block to reaching agreement in decision making: in order to 
establish effective shared strategies devoted to the conservation of biodiversity, an agreement 
on the definition of biodiversity, even provisional and operative, must be reached. I suggest 
that such agreement can be reached, since the term ‘biodiversity’ is not genuinely ambiguous. 
 
Firstly, a distinction has to be made between a definition proper (which must specify the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for something to fall under the concept ‘biodiversity’) and 
the relevant standards of application (through which we can determine whether something 
does, in fact, fall under the concept). While a definition must be universal, semantically and 
etymologically well-founded and not biased toward any particular discipline (at least 
according to DeLong 1996), standards of application are discipline-relative. Every standard 
aims, within the scope of the relevant discipline, to say how ‘biodiversity’ applies in that 
particular discipline. Now, in the event that a term is genuinely ambiguous, there is no (non-
disjunctive) definition that can capture different uses of the term in its different contexts. 
‘Seal’, for instance, is a genuine ambiguous term5, meaning sometimes the nice fish-eating                                                         
5 The example comes from LaPorte 2007. 
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aquatic mammal and sometimes a kind of stamp. There is no and there can’t be one “natural” 
definition of it. Compare ‘seal’ with ‘flat’. The term ‘flat’ too is used differently in different 
contexts, for instance a flat matrass, a flat voice, or a flat fee. Nonetheless, different users of 
the term can agree on a natural definition of it, probably something very general along the 
following lines: “something smooth and even, without marked lumps, curves, or 
indentations”. The same goes for ‘biodiversity’: the great terminological variation is not due 
to a genuine ambiguity of the term, but rather to the fact that concerns for biodiversity relate 
not only to several realms of human practice, but also to several different scientific 
disciplines, where the term is applied with different standards of application. Accordingly, 
under the umbrella of a general and universally agreed definition, the inconsistency of the 
standards of applications could—at least in principle, I am not saying that it would be easy—
be solved, for instance making their use explicit.  
 
4. An elusive notion 
 
The notion of biodiversity is a deeply intuitive one but, like time for Augustine, “If no one 
asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks, I do not know” 
(Confessions XI, 14). The diversity and variety of the forms of life is all around us, we just 
need to look at a garden, a park, or a seabed to become aware of that, and when ordinary 
people use the word ‘biodiversity’, they immediately understand each other, without any 
need for further clarifications. In spite of its intuitiveness, however, to illustrate what 
biodiversity is in an exhaustive and universally accepted way threatens to be a hopeless 
challenge, as testified by the multitude of conceptions (first of all, vernacular vs. scientific) 
and the more than 80 definitions currently available. Why is it so? And what is biodiversity? 
 
A prima facie difficulty comes from the fact that both words that form the term ‘biodiversity’ 
are poorly defined and intrinsically problematic. Even leaving aside the endless debate on the 
meaning of bio (there is no unanimous agreement among biologists on what life is, and we 
cannot—at least, not yet—rely on an uncontroversial criterion to distinguish what is living 
and what is not), the notion of diversity is a problematic one, mainly because of its 
vagueness. How diverse is diverse enough? And under which respects? It is for that reason 
that, for instance, Quine (1969) suggested that abandoning the notion of similarity (on which 
diversity is constructed by opposition) would be a mark of the maturity of science, given the 
impossibility to transform the intuitive notion of similarity into a scientific respectable one 
“where the animal vestige is wholly absorbed into the theory” (p. 55). Nonetheless, Quine 
himself recognizes its profound rooting in common sense along with its probable 
indispensability in science because of its role in induction.  
 
The dubiousness of this notion is itself a remarkable fact. For surely there is nothing more basic to 
thought and language than our sense of similarity; our sorting of things into kinds … The notion 
of a kind and the notion of similarity or resemblance seem to be variants or adaptations of a single 
notion. Similarity is immediately definable in terms of kind; for things are similar when they are 
two of a kind … We cannot easily imagine a more familiar or fundamental notion than this, or a 
notion more ubiquitous in its applications. On this score it is like the notions of logic: like 
identity, negation, alternation, and the rest. And yet, strangely, there is something logically 
repugnant about it. For we are baffled when we try to relate the general notion of similarity 
significantly to logical terms. (pp. 42-3) 
 
If Quine is right, similarity and the cognate notion of diversity are at the same time 
unavoidable and scientifically unrespectable notions. Hence, biodiversity would seem to be a 
scientifically dubious notion in its very core. Yet, all of us (and the other animals, too) have a 
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sort of innate sense of similarity and diversity, either as a product of evolution (if we accept 
the evolutionary epistemological hypothesis6) or as the result of cultural transmission (see 
Maffie 1998). Moreover, similarity and diversity are someway tightly bound to a notion that 
in the philosophy of science plays a central role, namely that of natural kind.  
 
Natural kinds are supposed to be the referents of words like ‘tiger’, ‘lemon’, and ‘human 
being’, roughly corresponding to naïve or phenomenological species, and they are supposed 
to be those groupings that we would find “ready-made” in the world, independently of our 
cognitive practices, theories and language; they are supposed to be those articulations, to use 
a well known metaphor7, according to which the world would be in itself structured and 
which our scientific classifications have always sought to reflect, at first imprecisely and then 
more and more faithfully thanks to the progressive refinement of our scientific knowledge. 
 
While natural kinds traditionally conceived—i.e., understood as classes whose members 
share one or more essential properties—are considered a dead issue in evolutionary biology, 
phenomenological species continue to be the basis of taxonomic practice (which is probably 
why phenomenological species are found both in the vernacular and in the scientific concepts 
of biodiversity). The first step in building a biological classification is indeed to collect 
samples of a certain kind, as the following anecdote from Darwin’s autobiography (1958: 62) 
exemplifies: 
 
But no pursuit at Cambridge was followed with nearly so much eagerness or gave me so much 
pleasure as collecting beetles. It was the mere passion for collecting, for I did not dissect them and 
rarely compared their external characters with published descriptions, but got them named 
anyhow. I will give a proof of my zeal: one day, on tearing off some old bark, I saw two rare 
beetles and seized one in each hand; then I saw a third and new kind, which I could not bear to 
lose, so that I popped the one which I held in my right hand into my mouth. Alas it ejected some 
intensely acrid fluid, which burnt my tongue so that I was forced to spit the beetle out, which was 
lost, as well as the third one. 
 
This presupposes a (built-in or acquired) disposition to perceive things as similar or diverse. 
After this first step, a taxonomist must go further, and check whether those phenomenological 
differences are in some way connected to evolutionary processes or, to put it differently, 
whether a supposed phenomenological species correspond to a genuine evolutionary one (in 
most controversial cases, molecular biological technologies are used, e.g., DNA barcoding). 
 
 
5. The Inventory of Life: from Natural Kinds to the Phylogenetic Tree 
 
It is a rather uncontroversial stance that “biodiversity both as a vernacular and a scientific 
concept is about the classification of perceptible things and phenomena, especially species” 
(Oksanen 2004: 2). More precisely, biodiversity has to do with taxonomy, namely the                                                         
6 According to a hypothesis coming from evolutionary epistemology (see Oksanen & Pietarinen 2004: 2), 
human minds have evolved so as to be receptive to nature’s diversity. (Note that this already presupposes a 
realistic stance towards natural diversity that cannot be taken for granted, as we will see.) To put it briefly, in 
order to survive, primitive men and women had to be able to distinguish edible from non-edible fruits, 
dangerous from harmless animals, toxic from non-toxic plants, etc. Accordingly, the ability of perceiving 
nature’s diversity would be a sort of adaptive trait. 
7 In the Phaedrus, Plato’s Socrates claims that we should “cut it [the speech] up in accordance with its forms at 
the natural joints, and not try to break up any part like a bad butcher” (265e). This statement has become an 




practice and the theory of classifying living things. As a matter of fact, the idea lying beyond 
the social construction of biodiversity was—as we have seen—to handle the decline of the 
biodiversity itself. In order to practically proceed with the achievement of this goal, we need 
to describe, evaluate, and assess the diversity of biological systems (an ecosystem, a forest, a 
lake, a biota…) at a given time. To do so, what is needed in the first place is, at large, the 
counting of the elements of the system and the assessment of the degree of differentiation 
among them. In other words, when we know what to count and how to compare what we are 
counting, we are making our way towards an understanding of what must be saved (and, at 
least partially, of what biodiversity is).  
 
But taxonomy is not a uniform field; it rather includes several schools giving different, and 




The father of modern taxonomy is unanimously considered Carl Linnaeus. His Systema 
naturæ per regna tria naturæ, secundum classes, ordines, genera, species, cum 
characteribus, differentiis, synonymis, locis (title of the 10th edition, 1758; first ed. 1735) 
established the nomenclature rules and the hierarchical structure as we all know them. 
Obviously, however, it does not take into account the theory of evolution. Linnaeus’s natural 
world, understood as the product of God’s creation, was a static one. Species were thought of 
as the atoms of the system by virtue of their having essences coming directly from God, so 
all species were already existent; no new species could ever appear because it would have 
meant that something was missing in the universe, hence that creation, and God himself as 
creator, were not perfect. While essentialism and creationism are no longer taken seriously in 
biology, Linnaeus’s system is still in use in spite of its static conception of the diversity of 
life. Indeed, it is the system referred to in the contemporary international codes that regulate 







From Darwin on, the whole picture changed drastically. Life evolves. It continuously 
produces (and loses) diversity. Species are significant atoms of this diversity, not because 
they have essences, but because they speciate, i.e., they originate new species by means of 
divergence processes (caused by different type of factors, from geographic isolation to 
hybridization), becoming extinct or transforming themselves through those processes. To 
account for the evolutionary world, Evolutionary Taxonomy intends to provide the Linnaean 
system with an historical reinterpretation in terms of phylogenesis, the historical ramification 
of lineages. In theory, if not in actual taxonomic practice, the similarity criterion is replaced 
by a causal-historical criterion. Briefly, species are now grouped in genera (and genera in 
more inclusive taxonomic categories), not according to their similarity but rather on the basis 
of their most recent common ancestor. Put differently, a genus is a group of species that has a 
fairly recent common ancestor and that, generally but not necessarily, exhibit similar 
inherited characters. Higher taxa are groups whose common ancestor lived in a more remote 
time; hence the evolutionary divergence among them is bigger, as is the corresponding 
phenotypical diversity.  
In spite of its attractiveness, evolutionary taxonomy is grounded on an unproved theoretical 
assumption, namely that phenotypic diversity and genetic relation covariate. It also suffers 
from the practical difficulty of individuating which characters8  must be considered as 
homologies, i.e., characters from whose presence it is possible to infer phylogenetic 
relationships. For example, heart and kidneys, which are found both in human beings and in 
chimps, are homologous organs, and witness a common evolutionary history. Likewise, it 
might be thought that vision—shared by insects and mammals—is the mark of a common 
evolutionary history. But it isn’t. Mammals and insects do not have any eyes-endowed 
common ancestor (see MacLaurin & Sterelny 2008, chap. 1). A further difficulty for                                                         
8 A character is a biological distinguishing feature that is characteristic for a particular, individual organism and 
can be used to classify, or identify it as a member of a particular taxon. 
Darwin’s first diagram of an evolutionary tree.  
From the first of his  Notebooks on 
Transmutation of Species (1837), the diagram is 
on view at the American Museum of Natural 
History in NYC.  A phylogenetic tree of life, created by David Hillis, Derreck Zwickil and Robin Gutell. http://www.zo.utexas.edu/faculty/antisense/Download.html 
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evolutionary taxonomy is that although it is based on evolutionary relations, it doesn’t make 
exclusive reference to them. 
 
 An example is the famous case of Reptilia taxon (Figure above). If we look at the ancestor-
descendent relations only, birds should be included in the same taxon (Reptilia) that includes 
lizards, snakes, and crocodiles. But according to evolutionary taxonomists, birds are too 
different from those other animals; hence birds should be included in a different taxon. By 
contrast, Cladistic Taxonomists—even though they proceed from the very same theoretical 
presuppositions as evolutionary taxonomists, namely, the idea that the main goal of a 
taxonomic system is to reconstruct the tree of life as it has been shaped by evolutionary 
forces—adopt a criterion that is thoroughly historical. No matter how diverse birds are from 
crocodiles, insofar as they originate from the same historical event of branching, they belong 
to the same κλάδος of the tree. It is rather clear that the choice does not depend on empirical 
matter only (we already know what we need to now about Reptilia’s members). How to 
choose then between the two classifications?    
 
 
6. The Species Problem  
 
Puzzles of the same kind are even more frequent when species are at issue, to the point that in 
the literature the difficulties tied to the concept of species have been codified under the label 
“Species Problem”. And Species Problem, as we are going to see, can seriously affect the 
description, assessment, and hence conservation of biodiversity. 
 
Both in taxonomy and in biodiversity species occupy a privileged place. In taxonomy, while 
higher ranks such as families or orders are often considered just arbitrary groupings, species 
enjoy a sort of ontological primacy: they are “more real”, so to speak, insofar as they are 
among the units of natural selection (at least according several biologists). In biodiversity, 
species diversity is almost unanimously thought as one of the main levels that have to be 
taken into account (along with genetic diversity and ecosystem diversity) when biodiversity 
is described, and species are generally the target of conservation policies. Moreover, species 
are of peculiar importance in the common-sense conception of biodiversity.  
 
Unfortunately, even though laws like the Endangered Species Act9 take for granted that we 
know exactly what species are (and how to count them univocally), identifying and counting                                                         
9 The Endangered Species Act of 1973 claims that “Species are objective entities that are easily recognized” 
(National Research Council 1995: ix) and defines them in a circular way as follows (notice also that the 
definition is applicable exclusively to organisms that reproduce sexually): “The term ‘species’ includes any 
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species is far less easy than it might seem at a first glance. Apart from disparities due to the 
fact that every taxonomic practice involve a certain amount of arbitrary choices by 
taxonomists, the disagreement about species delimitation and count is due to the fact that 
different researchers often use different species definitions (at least twenty concepts––i.e. 
families of definitions), depending on the field in which they work and on the type of 
organisms under consideration. For instance, a paleontologist will make use of a species 
concept based on morphological characters, whereas a zoologist will probably opt for an 
interbreeding-population concept. On the other hand, a species concept based on 
interbreeding will be fairly unserviceable to a bacteriologist, and so on. Disparities coming 
from this type of disagreement are a serious obstacle to the assessment of biodiversity and to 
the application of the policies devoted to species preservation. Consider the case of the red 
wolf, reported in an article in Scientific American by Zimmer (2008). The red wolf (Canis 
rufus) is considered a separate species, living in the southeastern U.S. Recently, this wolf has 
been the subject of a massive project to save it from extinction. But now the Canadian 
scientists argue that it is just an isolated population of C. lycaon and, luckily, thousand of 
exemplars of C. lycaon are still thriving in Canada. Or think about the Birds of Paradise: 
starting from the very same data, according to the phylogenetic concept such birds come in 
about 90 species, whereas according to the interbreeding-based species concept they come in 
40/42 species (see Cracraft 1992). How can we account for these disparities? And how can 
we handle them with an eye to the biodiversity preservation policies? 
 
The problem of delimiting and counting species is part and parcel of a more general issue that 
has become known in the literature under the name of “Species Problem”. It occasioned a 
very large amount of literature (see Stamos 2003 and Richards 2010 for an overview) and 
every author tends to identify it with a different issue. In the formulation by Stamos, for 
instance, 
 
In a sense, the species problem is really quite simple. Are biological species real, and, if real, what 
is the nature of their reality? Are species words merely operational conveniences made for the 
purpose of conveying various information and theories, or do species words refer to entities in the 
objective world with a real existence independent of science?” (Stamos 2003: 1) 
 
The question about the ontological status of species as stated by Stamos is divided in two 
parts: (i) Are species genuine denizens of reality, as a realist would claim, or are they just 
cognitive constructs, linguistic devices by means of which biologists dissect the external 
world, as a nominalist would rather contend? And (ii) If species are among the things that 
exist, what are they? Question (ii), in turn, can be understood in two different ways: How are 
species defined? And: What type of entity are they? As far as species definition is concerned, 
as said, different subgroups of biologists advocate different––and often incompatible––
accounts. Confronted with the multiplicity of species concepts, a monist, will claim that there 
is one and only one “right” species concept: perhaps it is among the species concepts 
currently proposed, or perhaps we need to trust biological progress and wait for the discovery 
of the right one, but the natural world has a structure of its own, and our taxonomy must 
mirror it. Several authors (Kitcher 1984, Mishler and Brandon 1987, Dupré 1993) are instead 
promoting a pluralistic approach, according to which there is no single correct species 
concept, one of the main reasons being that evolutionary mechanisms make it in principle 
impossible to pinpoint the essential property (or a cluster of such properties) that is needed in                                                                                                                                                                             
subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or 




order to talk of an unambiguous carving of species. Consequently, different partitions of the 
natural world are equally legitimate. As for the nature of species, on the traditional view 
species are construed as sets whose members are individual organisms sharing an essential 
property or a cluster of properties. Some authors (notably Ghiselin 1974 and Hull 1976) have 
argued instead that species are individuals, for species evolve whereas sets (which are 
abstract entities) are necessarily static.  
 
It should be clear that biodiversity and taxonomy are intrinsically intertwined: no description, 
assessment, conservation of biodiversity can do without taxonomy. But, along with the 
powerful instruments and articulate framework of taxonomy, biodiversity’s issue—in 
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